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Extra-household Norms and Intra-household Bargaining:
Gender in Sudan and Burkina Faso
Michael Kevane
Introduction
The hypothesis that the ongoing commercialization of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa
may be leading to a relative impoverishment of women is asserted on the basis many sources:
anecdotal material; small-sample, single-country surveys; meta-analysis of those surveys; and
creative interpretation of unreliable national-level statistics.  In he ab ence of large-scale1
representative samples of households and individuals across the continent, the assertion must
remain unverifiable.  But it is important enough to merit serious theorizing, both in an effort to
guide policy and to influence the design of further data-collection efforts. Future empirical
strategies for approaching the problem might productively focus on distinguishing and weighing
two complementary determinants of the changing fortunes of  women.  One determinant is the2
changing distribution of intra-household bargaining power.  The other determinant is the changing
constellation of social norms that constrain and regulate the economic activities of women.   This
chapter focuses on the second, showing how important social norms may be in the understanding
women’s economic activities in western Sudan and south-western Burkina Faso.
Carney’s and Watts’ (1990) discussion of an irrigation project in Gambia nicely illustrates
the differences between the two determinants.  The authors suggest that the net effect of the
project was a worsening of the position of women.  Men expropriated land previously controlled
2by women, and extracted more labor surplus.  But did this negative effect happen because
husbands, now granted title to more valuable land, were able to strengthen their bargaining
positions against their wives?  Or did it happen because men, now granted title to more valuable
land, were able to strengthen their bargaining positions against women?  The difference—
whether the change is within the household or without the household— is fundamental.  The
literature sometimes labels these two approaches the ‘intra-household’ and ‘extra-household’
approaches.3
Social norms that are generated and maintained at the extra-household level have two
distinct ways of affecting economic activities.  An indirect way is by affecting the bargaining that
goes on within households.  Norms may influence the ‘threat points’ and processes of intra-
household bargaining.  Agarwal (1997:15-22) notes that extra-household norms influence intra-
household bargaining by changing the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ options available to wives in the event
of disagreement.  Norms regarding childcare, divorce, bridewealth, remarriage, wife-beating, and
family responsibilities to daughters will change threat points.   Changes in these norms make the
threats of women to leave their household or not cooperate with their husband more or less
credible.  Norms may also regulate the nature of bargaining.  For example, norms may call for
silent acquiescence for women when men display anger; that is, norms may determine who has the
right to initiate or terminate bargaining.
But norms may also directly prescribe and proscribe certain activities for women; they are
‘activity-regulating.’   The effects of activity-regulating social norms may be quite significant. 
Women may be excluded from certain kinds of jobs or tasks, perhaps the more lucrative ones. 
Women may be prohibited from exploiting certain specific common-property resources such as
3wildlife or forests.  Women may be denied the right to interact with state officials and secure the
rents distributed by official credit, work, and extension programs.  Activity-regulating social
norms will also influence the distribution of bargaining power within households; but even if
women were not in households, or if households were characterized by shared preferences, they
would still be affected by activity-regulating norms.
Both the distribution of intra-household bargaining power and the constellation of activity-
regulating social norms vary with prices and technologies.  In the intra-household bargaining
approach, a standard result applies: changes in prices or technologies that alter options (either the
options of leaving the marriage or continuing in the marriage but not cooperating with the
husband-- a kind of one-person strike) will affect the decisions and actions men and women make. 
If changes in the external environment benefit men, they will be in stronger bargaining positions. 
For example, improvements in the prices of agricultural products benefit the owners of land; if
land owners always happen to be men, then men are now in stronger bargaining positions.  Many
development projects for women are based on the assumption that access to credit or outside
income will raise the bargaining power of women within the household.
The theory of how social norms change in response to commercialization and associated
changes in prices and technologies is comparatively under-developed.  While it is now generally
recognized that norms are endogenous, just how they might change is an open question.  Some
researchers favor an evolutionary modeling approach, arguing that norms change in an
‘unconscious’ way as individuals holding on to less ‘fit’ norms suffer economically (Young 1998). 
Others adopt threshold models of norms, where equilibrium strategies suddenly change when a
tipping point is reached with sufficient critical mass adopting a new strategy.  The changes in
4strategies are quite deliberate choices of individuals, but they are made in a decentralized manner. 
A recent paper by Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) offers a straightforward model along these
lines, and will be discussed below.  A third approach suggests that new norms— or ideologies--
are generated as the bargaining power of social groups change (Grundfest Schoepf 1985; Folbre
1997; and Ensminger and Knight 1997).  There is implicitly some level of social cooperation,
group cohesion and coordination, or collusion in this process. 
Figure 1 schematizes this discussion of how these two important social arenas determine
women’s agricultural activities.  Prices and technologies affect both intra-household bargaining
and extra-household negotiations or decentralized emergence of new norms.  Extra-household
norms affect intra-household bargaining.  Intra-household bargaining in turn affects the choices
made at the extra-household level; changes in the distribution of power within households may
undermine the collective bargaining position of women in negotiating extra-household norms (see
Carter and Katz 1997).
The distinction between intra-household bargaining and extra-household norms regulating
economic activities is quite relevant for an analysis of women’s involvement in commercial
activities in western Sudan and southwestern Burkina Faso.  In both of these regions, agriculture
is highly commercialized: farmers of western Sudan grow groundnuts and sesame primarily for the
markets, while farmers in Burkina Faso grow cotton for export.  There has been increasing
investment in market gardens and orchards (particularly in mango) irrigated by hand or small
pumps.  Burkina Faso has seen the introduction and adoption of animal traction and motorized
and un-motorized personal transportation (mobilettes and bicycles).  Cotton extension is
widespread, and with it use of imported pesticides and fertilizers.  Western Sudan has seen little
5change in the tools used in production, with virtually all farmers continuing to use the long-
handled hoe (hashasha). 
Both areas have seen significant expansion of the non-agricultural economy, consisting of
small-scale food processing, petty trade and local handicrafts. Women in western Sudan have
been active in establishing small restaurants and tea stands. Women knit and embroider small
prayer caps and clothing. In Burkina Faso, beer brewing is an important activity for many women.
Processing of butter from the oil of the karité nut, and processing as a condiment the pods from
the néré tree, are other common activities oriented towards the market. In some areas
considerable specialization of these tasks has taken place, with women in a village specializing in a
particular stage in the processing.  Extensive rural networks of traders have arisen to bring the
products to higher stage users, or even to export markets (Saul 1981).   Despite the changes in
Burkina Faso, incomes remain low and uncertain.  Incomes in rural western Sudan are certainly
among the lowest in the world.
The purpose of this chapter is to present evidence that extra-household activity-regulating
social norms matter a great deal in determining women’s involvement in agriculture and other
economic activities.  The chapter shows that the norms regulating activities vary considerably
across ethnic groups and change over time.  The inter-ethnic differences in norms, and
government-induced changes over time, are both seen to have large effects on behavior.   In
western Sudan, the military regime backed by the National Islamic Front has embarked on a
campaign to exclude women from the lucrative sales of tea and processed food in market spaces. 
In Burkina Faso, Mossi and Bwa villagers occupying the same area have quite different norms and
6behaviors.   The changes and differences in norms, and the subsequent effects, are different from
changes and differences in the distribution of intra-household bargaining power.
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, the literature that assesses the intra-household
approach with data and research from the Sahel area of sub-Saharan Africa is reviewed.  Second,
this is followed by a discussion of the notion of extra-household norms.  Third, how activity-
regulating social norms may be analyzed in the context of sub-Saharan Africa is considered. 
Fourth, these distinctions are applied to the context of western Sudan, where the military regime
has tried to directly alter the activity-regulating social norms, followed by an examination of the
differences in gendered norms across two ethnic groups in Burkina Faso, showing that the more
patriarchal Mossi do seem to have stronger norms regulating economic activity than the less
restrictive Bwa.  Finally the conclusion deals with some implications for policy.
The intra-household approach
The recent collection of papers edited by Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997)
summarizes some of the major work and ideas produced by the intra-household approach.  The
approach draws on analysis initiated by the game-theoretic models of the household.  This view
sees men and women in ‘cooperative conflict’ within the household: on the one hand they are
engaged in the production of public goods (like children and a sense of family and home)
characterized by ‘team’ production processes where it is hard to determine the value of the
marginal product of  individual contribution; on the other hand, they each want to obtain
consumption or prestige goods for themselves or for children they care about.  So the interests of
7household members converge and diverge at the same time.  An appropriate way to model these
kinds of situations is by using models of bargaining.
The empirical literature on households has confirmed that households are generally not
characterized as having a single altruistic or dictatorial head, or even as having shared preferences. 
In that view, often termed the ‘unitary model,’ men and women’s time and income are allocated
according to comparative advantage.  Instead of efficient allocation, however, it seems there is
considerable leeway in the abilities of women and children to exert bargaining power and make
choices.  The process of determining the allocation of labor and income and the adoption of4
technologies is thus not one-sided, or the result of a ‘unitary’ joint family decision process. 
Households are 'contested terrains.’  Guyer (1988:160), for instance, concludes that:
The assumption that the domestic group is a tightly functional unity of the
kind put forward in Becker's recent theoretical work (1981) is untenable,
even at the straighforwardly descriptive level.  It matters who gains control
of output because men and women have different spending preferences, not
necessarily because they hold different values but because they are in
structurally different situations.
One way researchers prove wrong the ‘unitary’ model is by showing that women allocate
their labor and capital toward activities that put income under their direct control even if it is not
efficient. Von Braun and Webb (1989), following upon earlier work by Ram and Singh (1988)
and Jones (1986), find that gross margins (value minus variable input costs except for unpaid land
and labor, per day of unpaid labor) on male-controlled communal plots are typically double those
of  'private' female plots in Gambia.   Udry (1996) demonstrates that in a panel sample from
8Burkina Faso, the yields on women’s fields are lower than on men’s fields, controlling for year,
plot and household specific effects.  Extensive specification testing rules out most of the usual
candidates for reconciling this finding with household allocative efficiency: women’s plots are not
of inferior quality; women are not overly constrained by child ‘rearing’ duties; women’s plots are
not treated differently because of fixed ‘travel’ costs; and the technology does not appear to differ
across men and women.  Findings of differences in yields are signs of inefficiency within
households.  Simply reallocating labor and manure to the women's fields (small as they might be)
would generate higher income for the household.  Why not do that, and divide up the extra
production?  The findings imply that households are not ‘unitary,’ but rather are characterized by
bargaining.
In a bargaining framework, it is expected that men and women allocate their resources in
ways that raise their 'threat points.’  If a woman ceded control of her land and labor to her
husband, she would have no credible threat if he failed to give her consumption goods.  Women
maintain flexibility within the conjugal unit by reserving part of their labor for their own land. 
Productivity differences arise because the conjugal unit more closely resembles a contractual,
bargained relationship than a 'family' maximizing common welfare (Quisumbing 1996). 
Another way of proving wrong the ‘unitary’ model is to show that allocations and
inefficiencies vary across households in ways predicted by the intra-household bargaining
approach, but not by the comparative advantage approach.  Some researchers have examined
what factors make unequal rights between men and women matter more or less for individual
women.  Saul (1989) asks how different Bobo women from Burkina Faso are affected by and
manipulate the margins and ambiguities of limited land use rights.  He shows that patterns of
9activity are more or less binding according to factors such as wealth and age that influence
bargaining within households and lineages.  Age frequently determines the autonomy that women
have in their allocation of time, and Saul (1989:173) describes how women go “through
successive stages of increasing autonomy during their lifetime.”  Older women and widows often
have a wider choice of crops to plant, hours they can work, and land which they can cultivate. 
They often ‘separate’ from the household, in stark contrast to the comparative advantage
approach which would suggest that as a woman gets older the ‘human capital’ she builds up
regarding the household enterprise would make it advantageous for her to be more, not less,
involved in the household. Saul points out that the entire range of women’s activities- not just
farmwork- is determined by the intra-household bargaining among a man and his wives and
among co-wives.  
It should not be surprising that when household decisions are the results of bargaining,
major transformations such as the deepening and extension of commercial relations with global
markets, development projects, and technological innovations have highly variable impacts.  Thus
Bassett (1988) argues that the introduction of cotton in Cote d'Ivoire led to a rapid intensification
of agriculture and increased time devoted to household production.  The increase in labor time
was borne by both men and women, but there was an apparent deterioration in the position of
women who ended up forming 90 percent of the hired wage labor force.  As Bassett (1991:233-
34) makes clear, the extensification of cotton was partly led by provision of  subsidized cotton
inputs that were directly almost exclusively to men.   Jones (1986), however, finds that in
Cameroon there was less intensification following the introduction of irrigation that permitted rice
growing.  The division of the increased surplus could not always be negotiated.  Some women
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acquiesced to the increased demands for labor from their husbands, but many simply refused to
devote large amounts of time to rice production.  These women withdrew from household
production activities and concentrated on their own, separate, sorghum plots, or worked as wage
laborers.
Activity-regulating norms in sub-Saharan Africa
Changes in the distribution of power within households, and the subsequent
reorganizations of work and rewards, are not the only mechanism through which external changes
like increased commercialization affect the welfare of women.  Women may be subject to social
norms that bind and determine their actions (Obbo 1976; Roberts 1984; Roberts 1988).  These
norms are negotiated and replicated at the extra-household level.  Implicit marriage contracts may
contain agreements that women will  work a specific amount of time on the fields of their
husbands.  More generally, women may not have control over their labor, and be ostracized if
they try to work off the farm.  Women's ownership rights to plots obtained through inheritance
and marriage may be tenuous.  A man may refuse to lend money to a woman, fearing that no
court will enforce repayment.  There may be taboos against women handling manure.  In many
areas of northern Nigeria, women among the Muslim Hausa ethnic group are forbidden from
working in public labor markets, either in the village or out in the fields.  This prohibition is
known as kulle, which Hill (1969:398) refers to as a ‘virtual incarceration’ (see alsoSolivetti
1994).  Turrittin (1988) notes the growing importance Wahhabism, an Islamic sect spreading
rapidly in Mali, in fostering stricter norms about women's activities outside of the home.
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The literature analyzing these activity-regulating norms has argued  that gendered norms
may in fact be the outcome of gender contests.  That is, researchers have tried to show that in
certain contexts it is proper to speak of men and women as antagonists in the public negotiations
over social norms and institutions (despite most men and women sharing households, with the
important exception of sometimes significant numbers of female-headed households).  Folbre
(1986:21) suggests that, “neoclassical institutionalists, like conventional Marxists, have largely
ignored the possibility that men might develop and defend institutional forms of power in a
systematic way.”  Folbre (1997) has more recently articulated exactly what these negotiations are
about, using the phrase ‘gender coalitions’ to make explicit the idea that men and women may
indeed bargain collectively.  In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Saul (1989:174) describes the
issue clearly: “The possibility of the formation of gender blocs dividing all production units right
in the middle should not be underestimated; in protest movements or rituals of reversal [such as
the Nigerian ‘Sitting on a Man’ case] such blocs manifest a strikingly physical reality.”  The
literature has a wealth of anecdotes detailing exactly this possibility.  A recent collection of papers
in the Canadian Journal of African Studies, introduced by  Hodgson and McCurdy (1996), offers
numerous accounts of this social negotiation over legitimate activities of women.
Social norms and collective action appear to be quite important.  Carney and Watts (1990)
argue that the Jahaly-Pacharr Gambian irrigation project, the latest in a series of interventions
designed to reduce rice imports, provoked unexpected kinds of conflicts.  The particular external
production relations were 'inflected inward' to the conjugal unit, rather than expressed 'outward'
as in earlier instances of peasant resistance.  Struggles over meaning permeated household
relations; norms were renegotiated and changed (ibid.: 228): "As a consequence women have
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withdrawn their labor from the rice fields, an explosive tactic with far-reaching impact on the
social organization of household production."  Von Bulow (1992:538), discusses how in Kenya
tea areas, women similarly refused to pick tea following changes in external factors; they
withdrew their labor from their husbands.  Comparatively low yields and increases in wage labor
were the outcomes of these struggles over activity-regulating norms.  
A model of activity-regulating norms
Commercialization of agriculture, through the continuing introduction of new crops or
through changes in relative prices on global markets that encourage specialization in export-
oriented or urban-oriented production, may affect activity-regulating norms.  To understand how,
it is necessary to be more specific on exactly what norms are.  One approach is to define a norm is
a regularity in the strategies that people follow when they are in strategic situations (when the
consequences of their choices depend directly on the choices of others).  The regularity is created
by the expectation that others too follow the same regularity.  A norm in this definition is a
convention, and one follows a convention because breaking the convention risks undermining the
convention itself.  Since the convention yields benefits, the convention is sustained when the
benefits (discounted over a lifetime) outweigh the benefits of breaking the convention and living
the remainder of one’s life without the convention.  An extension of this approach is to define a
norm as a regularity in strategic behavior sustained by sanctions against violators.  This is a
stronger definition than the first because now the costs of the norm may outweigh the benefits,
but the costs of breaking the norm are endogenously higher; in addition to having some interest in
13
abiding by the convention for the benefits of the convention itself, people also want to avoid
explicit punishment for violating the convention.
With this understanding of norms, consider a stylized model, introduced into the literature
by Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996), which may be adapted to a sub-Saharan setting.  In this
model, men and women have to decide whether or not to agree to marry.  The problem for a man
is that he can only marry a finite number of times (for simplicity assume it is once).  He would like
to marry a wife who will be cooperative in working on the family enterprise.  That is, the man is
like an employer, and has only so many chances to hire an employee.  He certainly does not want
a wife/employee who will spend most of her time off on her own activities.  So the man may want
to extract a promise from the potential wife that she will work for him, and not spend much of her
time on her own income-generating activities.  The woman, of course, would much rather not
make such a promise: who knows whether her husband will pay her well for work she does on his
family enterprise?  When asking for a promise not to work on self-owned income-generating
activities, the man risks that the woman will simply refuse, and go try her luck in the marriage
‘market’ with another potential partner.
Promises are assumed to be enforceable— the wife cannot renege on the promise.  The
man has to decide whether to request such a promise and risk having the woman refuse.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows the structure of the game that men and women play as they decide
whether to marry a particular person.  The man has the first decision of whether to insist that the
woman must work for him if they marry.  If the man does not insist, the woman of course marries
(men are assumed identical in all other respects).  She can do no better by waiting.  Her net payoff
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is given by r-p, with r the benefits and p the costs of marriage.  The net payoff is assumedf f f f
positive.  If the man insists that she work for him, and she agrees to be married under this
condition, her payoff is r-p-d, where d is the cost of not allocating her time optimally, but ratherf f f f
having the husband control some significant amount of her time.
The man gets a benefit r from marriage, but this comes at a cost.  The cost of marriage ism
being tied down, as it were, by wife and child and hence foregoing opportunities for
entrepreneurship.  Men, for whatever reasons, are the only people who can be entrepreneurs and
take advantage of new activities.  Perhaps only they have access to capital markets.  The cost of
foregoing entrepreneurship is p .  When the wife works for the man, part of this cost is offset bym
the advantage of having ready labor at hand, and this is represented by d.  So the man’s netm
benefit when marrying with a promise from the woman that she will work for him is r-p +d.  m m m
In this situation, the man’s best strategy depends crucially on what he thinks other men are
doing.  If all other men demand that women work for them,  then the man will also make such a
demand.  Why? Because if his potential wife refuses, and goes off to consider other men, she will
find they are all making the same demand, so she may as well have accepted the initial offer with
its demand of a promise to work.  Forseeing this, she will indeed accept a demand that the man
control her time.  If, on the other hand, few men demand such promises, then the equilibrium
strategy for the man may be to also not demand that the woman work for him after marriage.
In this structure, a norm is an equilibrium where people are observed following similar
strategies because they assume that other people will follow the same strategy.  The norm may
change if any of the payoffs change.  Suppose, for instance, that the initial equilibrium is one
where men and women marry without any promises that oblige the woman to work for the man. 
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It may then arise that increasing commercialization raises, for entrepreneurial men, the
opportunity cost of being married.  This leads them to demand that their future wives work for
them.  Other men, who may have no intentions of being entrepreneurs, ‘piggyback’ off the
demands made by the entrepreneurs.  If the entrepreneurs constitute a significant fraction of the
population, then all men will demand promises that the women work for them.  A change that
affects a fraction of men-- those entrepreneurs who could take advantage of new commercial
opportunities— potentially impoverishes all women.
A norm that men insist that their future spouses work for them may come to be sustained
by sanctions.  If a man were to marry and allow his wife to do as she pleases, he might find
himself harassed, ostracized and boycotted by other men.  Then, the demands of men that their
wives work for them may continue to characterize the marriage ‘market’ even after changes in
prices or technologies that favor the independent activities of women.  An inefficient norm may
well persist (Akerlof 1980).  So women may continue to be relatively impoverished even as the
tide of commercialization turns in their favor, as demand for market processing and trading
grows.
The clearest example of this kind of process comes from Kenya, where Hakannson (1986)
documented the changing fortunes of Gusii women.  At one time a woman marrying was entitled
to ownership or at least clear control over house property.  Over the 1970s and 1980s, however,
men increasingly refused to honor this right; they were insisting on marrying outside the
traditional customs.  Men seemed to want more flexibility in the matter of disposing of their land. 5
The new ‘elopement’ marriage came with no implicit right to property.  As more and more men
demanded this advantageous form of marriage, women either reluctantly agreed or else refused
16
marriage propositions in the hopes of finally attracting a suitor willing to marry under the old
terms.  As more men demanded the advantageous marriage, the chance of finding other men fell,
and women came to accept the new terms.  This, of course, made men even less willing to offer
the old terms; they knew they could easily find a woman willing to marry the new way.
Activity-regulating norms in western Sudan
A dramatic instance of changing local norms regarding permissible economic activity by
women occurred in Bireka, a small village in western Sudan, during the period 1991-1992.  In
1989 the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in Sudan through a military coup.  One of the
principal policies of the new regime in Khartoum was to regulate the economic activities of
women.  The regime focused in particular on restricting women’s tea-brewing and beer-brewing6
activities.  (In 1997 the government acknowledged that its strategy had perhaps gone too far, and
released over 400 women imprisoned in the capital Khartoum, most of whom had been jailed with
small children and infants, for selling tea or brewing beer.)  The government had few resources
with which to implement its strictures, but it turned out that few were needed.  In many villages
simmering ethnic, factional, religious and class conflicts were ready, as Carney and Watts (1990)
suggested, to be ‘inflected’ onto the sphere of gender relations.  Norms over women’s behavior
became the battlefield for broader village conflicts.  The new ammunition provided by the
national-level shift in government power, rhetoric and policy proved sufficient to bring about new
norms of behavior, self-enforced, at the village level.7
Bireka was in 1990 a village settled by three ethnic groups, and comprising about 50
households.  About one fourth of the residents called themselves Arabs, and maintained control
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over formal political structures and claimed ownership over most of the agricultural land in the
area.  The chief traditional leader for the region, the omda, belonged to the Arab group, and in
1991-92 was given police and judicial powers as part of a program of devolution of authority. 
Another fourth of the residents were Burgo immigrants from Chad, who settled at roughly the
same time as the Arabs at the beginning of the century.  The remaining majority of the villagers
were Hausa, who settled over the years, some as late as the 1970s or 1980s.  Most of the Hausa
rented their land on an annual basis, paying only a token sum in advance and then a ten percent
share after harvest.  All of the villagers pursued diversified activities; the agricultural season was
extremely short, and during the dry season many men left for work in other areas of the country.
In Bireka, as elsewhere in Sudan, the very dramatic deterioration of the national
macroeconomy hastened processes leading to increased specialization, reliance on wage labor
work, and breakdown of larger extended families.  While these changes before the 1980s
impoverished some, they very often improved welfare for farmers and pastoralists.  After the
1980s, however, commercialization, where economic activities were increasingly organized
through markets, was associated with more general and unambiguous declines in income and
welfare (see, among others, Kursany 1983, Tully 1988, Gray and Kevane 1993, and Sultan 1993). 
Young men increasingly migrated to towns, often leaving their wives and mothers in precarious
economic situations (Kevane 1994; Rielly 1991).  They left to join the army, or were conscripted
into militias, or sought the limited educational opportunities available as the government
abandoned (in the face of military costs associated with the civil war) its commitment to rural
education.  The inter-seasonal prices of sorghum and millet turned against the majority of poor,
credit-constrained farmers, who sold in the months after harvest and then had to purchase grain at
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inflated prices during the ‘hungry season.’  The grain-livestock terms of trade also exacerbated
rural incomes, as livestock prices plummeted during years of scarce pastures.  These processes led
to a feminization of poverty, mitigated only by increased remittance income from men migrating
abroad.
In this environment, on 13 October 1991 the following letter was received by the sheikh of
Bireka:
To the Sheikh of the village of Bireka:
With regard to the decision issued by the security committee of the district
administration, number 46/l/1/1, on 1/8/91, is it declared to the owners (male and
female) of coffeehouses [gahawi ] in Um Belda that they must destroy their8
buildings and structures by 19/10/91, in order to make it feasible to us to prepare a
plan for that area in the future, after the complete clearing of the present
structures.  We will compel the owners who have not destroyed their buildings by
confiscating their furnishings and opening a police complaint against them, so we
urge them to complete the clearing of their buildings in the period available. 
Thank you.  
Signed: Inspector of the local government of Sheikan9
This letter, ordering the destruction of a thriving roadside market mostly run by women, was the
initiation of a rapid process of changing attitudes towards women’s work. 
In 1990, the roadside was probably the most dynamic sector of the local economy, and it
was dominated by women.   A large number of younger unmarried Burgo women from Bireka 
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operated coffeehouses, tea stands and restaurants.  Two older Arab women also had stands; both
were very poor women.  Many young Arab women from Um Belda, a neighboring village along
the road, also operated stands.  Young Hausa girls sold sesame candies, roasted groundnuts, and
cowpea falafel, known as ta'miya. 
Some men profited from the popularity of the women’s tea stands.  One Hausa household
of three brothers operated a stand, often hiring young Arab and Burgo men from Bireka to work
for them.  The sons of a wealthy local merchant operated, intermittently, a large stand.  Two
Hausa men from a neighboring village sold grilled meat at night.  Young men often set up small
stands in front of the gahawi and sold vegetables and cigarettes brought from El Obeid, the
regional capital.  Farmers sold watermelons.  The stands were supplied by a Hausa man from
Bireka who operated a fairly large store (also selling black market cigarettes and gasoline to lorry
drivers and travelers), and an Um Belda man with a small tin shack, a kushk.  A Hausa butcher
slaughtered sheep, goats and occasionally cows every morning.  An Arab from Bireka owned a
small firewood bakery and supplied the stands with bread.  A Burgo man with a donkey cart
transported water from a well (about two kilometers away).  Young men from all ethnic groups
were hired by the women to build straw shelters (rakuba) and larger mud structures.
The young Burgo and Um Belda women who worked their tea stands earned income that
was quite high by local standards.  Some reported, in 1990, making profits of from LS 30 on a
bad day up to LS 100 on a good day, a time when the average daily wage for agricultural labor
was around LS 30.  Most participated in a revolving savings fund with the other tea women.  One
woman with three shares in the fund took home LS 3600 in savings every two months.  The
women lived with their parents.  In several cases, because these women had extensive working
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capital, they supported the entire family.  In one family, a conflict emerged as to who would
control the income from family agriculture.  The daughter had hired the agricultural labor with her
earnings from her tea-shop, so she expected to control the income even though her parents
considered it family agriculture.
These intra-household conflicts over shares and control of income were, apparently,
managed and kept under control because the size of the pie was large and expanding; perceptions
were that participation in the roadside economy was a positive sum game.  These perceptions
were not shared by other actors.  The ‘government,’ at the instigation of a faction of male Arab
villagers, ordered the stands closed.  The women were accused of being prostitutes, of selling
prohibited local beer, and of not respecting the government.  The government officials masked
these concerns, in their official written documentation, with appeals to ‘demarcation’ and
‘bringing order’ to the market, and making women respect health ordinances.  
Here is one young woman’s account of the closure and destruction of the gahaw :10
The gahawi were first closed by the government in late 1991, it was the
people of the People's Committee [village council].  They opened again in
Ramadan [the spring of 1992].  The people who opened them were the Shabab al
watun, the 'Youth of the Nation' organization [a radical youth group set up by the
military regime], that was formed by Nuur el Din Mohamed from the market
village.  He held a big meeting with a microphone with about thirteen girls and
thirteen boys.  A lot of the Burgo girls were there.  The Shabab op ned the
gahawi and said they would knock the police if they tried to stop them.
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But about ten girls were taken to the neighbouring market village, and
spent the whole day in the 'prison' yard next to the police station.  They were taken
to El Obeid [the regional capital], and held outside the court.  The police did not
take them in, because they knew that they had no reason to close the gahawi in the
first place.  They brought the girls back.  Those people are greedy.  Later the girls
opened them again for three months.  As soon as the omda got power he closed
them.  And they kept them closed out of respect for the omda. 
But until now they have no reason to have closed the gahawi. Why don't
they close the gahawi in El Ibnoya [a road stop a few kilometers down the road]? 
Why not close them in the market village?  They are all in the same administrative
area.  After the omda closed them people said they would go and make a formal
complaint before the commissioner of the whole region of Kordofan, or go to the
court.  Anyway, when the Shabab reopened the stands the police came and wanted
to hit them, but the Shabab said they were the government and they would hit the
police.  We had I.D. cards, we ourselves were the government.
When they closed the gahawi I and others went and complained that we
were oppressed because we had borrowed in the morning and when they closed
we could not pay back the loans, and some had debts of LS 5000 to the
storekeeper, butcher, and baker.  And the People's Committee said we had to
swear on the Koran that this was true- which we did- and the government would
repay all the outstanding loans- which they did not.
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After the Shabab al watun opened them and they were closed again about
ten of the girls went to work under the trees near the road in Um Belda.  But the
omda again ordered them to stop.  They took the girls to court and said they
would fine them LS 300 or one month in prison.  How could people pay that
much?  A delegation of women went to Kazgeil and made a lot of noise.  The girls
said they would not pay, they would go to prison.  But the police brought them
out.  They were afraid to take them to the court in El Obeid.  They gave twenty-
five lashes to five girls.
By November of 1992 all the stands were closed, overgrown with weeds, clay walls tumbling
down.  Trucks drove past the roadside market, or stopped at other markets before and after the
Um Belda/Bireka market.  The women tea sellers lost much of their working capital, and the
storekeepers and butchers and bakers lost all of their business.
The closing of the gahawi represented a struggle and defeat for the women of the villages. 
It did not matter so much that the men may not have wanted to intentionally harm them; rather,
the norms of women’s activities became the yardstick by which power was measured.  The more
the norms were upheld and enforced, the more everyone knew who was in control of the village. 
In the process women came to be prohibited from certain public economic activities.  This process
took place outside (without) the household.  It could not be argued that the change reflected a
strengthening of bargaining within the households of the village.  Very clearly, women’s activities
at the roadside were highly lucrative, and many men would have gladly permitted their wives to
continue working for a larger share of the profits.  Indeed, if some men had decided to keep their
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wives at home or in the fields, the profits of other men who chose not to exercise their enhanced
controls over women would have been even higher, as the ‘rents’ to be earned at the roadside
would have been divided among fewer women.
The closing of the gahawi may well reflect similar changes in the structures of women’s
commercial activities in Sudan.  Over the last decades, women have increasingly come to manage
and control independent agricultural enterprises.  While confirmation is not available due to the
paucity of research as the country has descended into disorder and intensified civil war, it is
reasonable to suppose that international and urban migration, and the ongoing civil war and
military conscription have been responsible for this pattern.  Ironically, the greater involvement of
women in commercial activities may have raised their profiles, leading the military regime to
adopt as a central policy and rhetorical plank a commitment to strengthening regulation of
women’s economic activities.
Activity-regulating norms in Burkina Faso
Norms regulating the activities of women in increasingly commercialized agriculture were
also well in evidence in southwestern Burkina Faso.  This was true of the majority Bwa ethnic
group, as well as many other local groups and the fast-growing migrant community from the
Mossi ethnic group.  The setting for this study was the village of Bereba, roughly one hundred
kilometers north-east of Bobo-Dioulasso (capital of Houet province).  Bereba lay in the heart of
Burkina Faso's cotton zone, a dynamic and expanding sector of the national economy.  The center
of the village was the old Bwa residential area that bordered a large seasonal stream, a bas fonds
currently being developed for rice cultivation.  On the southern edge of the Bwa village an
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enormous kapok tree shaded the market, held on Mondays and Fridays.  Mossi migrants used to
settle around the market, but in the past few decades the influx of migrants had led to settlements
dispersed around the village.  A census taken in 1994 listed 121 families (including several very
large compounds of 40-50 people) with a total population of 1317 (up from 1193 in 1985,
according to the national census, an increase of only 10 percent over the decade).  Two thirds of
the households were Bwa, one third Mossi, and a scattering of Dafing, Djula, Samogo.  The great
majority of the Bwa adhered to the local Do religion, while the majority of Mossi were Muslim. 
About 100 villagers were Christian.  
The village was very well developed in terms of using animal traction, fertilizer, pesticides
and improved cotton and maize seed.  There were few tractors, however, and many families still
cultivated large areas by hand.  Oxen were readily rented, though the price was high and timing
was not always assured.  Thus the village was typical of the entire area of southwestern Burkina,
which had experienced rapid transformation as cultivation of cotton and adoption of
mechanization was supported and subsidized.
Men and women in Bereba organized their lives in ways similar to the general descriptions
of household relations in West Africa.  Forced marriages and polygyny were common.  Separate
budgets and activities were common.  Men owned most of the property and wealth, women
complained that they were poorly compensated for their contributions to household production.
In Bereba, gender inequality appeared to be more pronounced among the Mossi.  There
was a clear popular ranking: Bwa women were more ‘free’ than Mossi women.  But the11
comparison was difficult to make.  Both groups followed practices suggestive of unequal status. 12
Bwa women were married through stylized ‘kidnappings,’ where the young man would steal his
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bride in the night.  As long as he carried out the required three work parties on her parents fields,
she was obligated to stay with him.  There was considerable wife-beating, in part associated with
the over-consumption of alcohol.  Bwa women could not own land.  They often married outside
of their villages.  An incident in 1996 suggested the force of norms regarding marriage and
widowhood:
Bezoun met a woman named N'miegnidofini from Woro, whose husband had
recently died.  She was visiting a relative in Tui.  They agreed to marry.  She left
for Woro to retrieve her belongings, but on the appointed day for them to meet
Bezoun found himself confronted by three armed men claiming to be
N'miegnidofini's brothers-in-law.  They said she could not marry him, that she
belonged to Woro, and she had to stay in their household.  Bezoun fled, but the
next day N'miegnidofini joined him.  Soon therafter the brothers came to Tui and
called all the women of Woro married in Tui.  "You must return to Woro.  Bezoun
has no right to take N'miegnidofini, and if he insists on keeping her then we will
insist that you come back to Woro, since you belong to Woro."  Early the next
morning eleven women met in a house outside of Tui, prepared with their small
sacks to leave.  Elders from Tui talked with the men from Woro, and with Bezoun,
and with N'miegnidofini.  Finally N'miegnidofini agreed to return to Woro.  At
twilight, the other women returned to their homes and families.
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Because N'miegnidofini’s actions threatened inter-village relations, the men of Tui were willing to
force eleven women— wives of their co-villagers— to return to Woro, leaving their children and
hearths behind.
But Mossi women were perhaps in an even more disadvantageous position.  They were
much more ‘submissive’ in terms of personal, ritualized gestures towards men (such as kneeling
with bowed head when talking with men).  Some ventured into the market with great reluctance. 
Forced marriages were more common.  Divorce very infrequent.  Mossi marriages were more
explicitly oriented towards creating family alliances in an uncertain environment; women were
often spoken of as ‘draft power’.  Divorce among the Bwa was common, with women leaving
their husband’s quite often and quite easily.  Women’s rights to their children were stronger.  Bwa
girls were much more likely to go to school.  Mossi women were prohibited from brewing beer
even though many Mossi women in the provinces of origin made the Mossi equivalent, raan. 
Bwa women seemed to be discouraged from farming on their own, and almost none had personal
fields.
In this atmosphere of a great multiplicity of gendered norms, there is also evidence of
direct activity-regulating norms.  The method here is to look for evidence of those norms by
comparing the two ethnic groups, the Bwa and the Mossi, and show that the more patriarchal
Mossi seemed to enforce norms that women work on the fields of their husbands.  Bwa women,
by contrast, seemed more free to allocate their time as they choose.  One way to test the
comparative restrictiveness of activity-regulating social norms is to examine data on the allocation
of time.  An implication of differences in restrictions is that the responsiveness of women, in terms
of their allocation of time, to the capital of their husbands, should vary by ethnic group.  If a
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woman was free to allocate her time, when her husband had more oxen she would be more likely
to go and work with him.  Her productivity on the farm would be high.  If her husband had no
oxen, she may well go off and work on another activity.  Women who belong to ethnic groups
that restrict women to work for their husbands will exhibit less responsiveness.  Regardless of
how many oxen their husbands’ have, they are required to work on the ‘family’ fields controlled
by the husbands. 
Figure 3 shows that in Bereba village the Bwa women were much more responsive to the
number of oxen owned by their husbands than were Mossi women.  The data were collected from
109 women in the 1995 season.  The women were asked every week how they had allocated their
time for each day in the previous week.  The figure shows the average percent of time worked by
a woman according to how many oxen were owned by her husband.  The first panel shows this
average time for ordinary week days, the second panel shows the averages for the two market
days of the village, when most men and women did not work in the fields.  The figure shows that
Mossi women almost always worked 20 percent of the time on the fields.  Bwa women worked
almost no time for their husbands when their husband’s had no oxen.  Regression analysis
(reported in Kevane and Wydick 1997) confirms that this result is robust when controlling for
other variables such as age, household wealth, education and children.  This differential
responsiveness is strongly suggestive of the existence of different norms regarding the appropriate
allocation of women’s time.  Mossi women seem more constrained.
[Figure 3 about here]
Further evidence on these differences comes from the three years of data collected by the
International Center for Research in the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT) who followed Mossi and
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Bwa households from 1981 to 1983 in four villages close to Bereba.  The ICRISAT survey
collected data on the total amount of time devoted by men and women from a household to the
‘family’ fields controlled by the male household head.  There were 77 Bwa or Mossi households. 
Figure 4 shows that when women were in households with more farm equipment, defined as
households that had oxen and either plows or carts, they worked more on the fields of their
husbands.  Each bar shows the percent difference between the average hours worked by women
on family fields in households with farm equipment and in households without farm equipment. 
The percent differences are high for Bwa women, for all three years, and low for Mossi women. 
Bwa women in households with more farm equipment worked significantly more than time than
did Bwa women in households without capital.  Mossi women in households with high farm
equipment, by contrast, worked only slightly more than Mossi women in households with low
farm capital.  As if to confirm this description, Mossi men worked less when they had more
capital, for two of the three years.  (The results of 1983, a drought year, may be somewhat
anomalous.)  Bwa men always worked more when their households had more capital.
[Figure 4 about here]
Conclusion
The discussions of women’s work in Sudan and Burkina Faso suggest that norms
regulating the socially permissible economic activities of women are important.  In Sudan, women
were prohibited from earning high incomes in the tea stands at the roadside market.  In Burkina
Faso, women of the Mossi ethnic group appear to be constrained in their allocation of time, and
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are not able to follow their Bwa neighbors who earn higher incomes from brewing beer or other
market work.  These two examples confirm the effects of activity-regulating norms.
The problem is that much of the literature has come to focus on intra-household issues as
the major research and policy arena of gender discussions.  Research has helped the understanding
how divergent preferences within households affect allocations of schooling, nutrition, calories,
and consumption goods to boys and girls, as well as how credit programs for women affect their
bargaining positions within households.  Also a subject of research is how commercialization
alters the threat points in household bargaining.  By contrast, less research is devoted to
understanding how public policy and economic change affects local norms that regulate the
activities of women.  Yet clearly this is a question of equal if not perhaps greater importance than
shifts in intra-household bargaining power.
There is a striking contrast in the policies suggested by the two approaches.  To take on13
example, the intra-household approach to women’s credit programs and women’s public works
programs has argued that these may have detrimental unintended consequences (Goetz and Gupta
1996).  A number of papers have argued that these programs induce women to devote extra hours
to earning income under their control, because this strengthens their bargaining position within the
household.  But this extra labor time outside of the home comes at the expense, it is argued, of
children’s care time and nutrition.  So the net positive effects of the programs may be marginal or
even negative.  The extra-household approach, however, would argue that policies and programs
that change local norms may have very large favorable effects for women and children.
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1.See, for example, Bernal (1988), Besteman (1995), Davison (1988), Dey (1981), Diduk (1989),
Hakansson (1986), Hemmings-Gapihan (1985).
2.Analysis of these determinants does not rule out the possibility that women are impoverished
not because they are women, but rather because they happen to be relatively asset-less or skill-less
in a changing economy.  This latter kind of explanation would focus on why the poor become
relatively poorer; the focus here is on why women might become relatively poorer.  Fortman
(1984) raises the possibility that there are no 'gender' distinctions made in the marketplace: the
fact that female household heads are poorer than male heads accounts for their variable
participation in factor markets.
3.See Katz (1991) and Koopman (1991).  Agarwal (1994, 1997) has perhaps been the staunchest
champion of the extra-household approach.  In discussing the welfare implications of women’s
unequal access to resources, Agarwal has drawn attention to the processes of national and
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community rule-making.  This rule-making or norm-making (in the case of more isolated village
societies) may be formal (as laws, written contracts, parliamentary and regional decision-making
body rules of procedure) or informal (one thinks of men’s clubs, sanctions against public
appearances and participation by women, codes of dress and marriage). 
4.Wolf (1990) has made this point explicitly, in the context of factory work in Indonesia and
Taiwan; see also Folbre (1984) and the papers in Dwyer and Bruce (1988).
5.While in the 1960s only 26% of women eloped, in the 1980s Hakansson found 87% eloped. 
Elopements and irregular unions that do not involve bridewealth payment have led to situations
where wives are no longer necessarily absorbed into the patrilineal tenure system.  These women
can be expelled from a man's land easily.  According to Hakansson (1986:10), "dissolution of
informal unions are mostly initiated by men."  This is not a phenomenon unique to Kenya.  Andre
and Platteau (1996:29) find, in their careful study of a Rwandan village, “roughly two-third of the
couples in N.  have been married without inkwano [customary payment], and the proportion is
obviously much higher among young couples.”  
6.Hale (1996:199) quotes a supporter of the NIF: “It is not that we forbid women to work.  If she
must work, then perhaps it is to the husband or to other male members of her family where we
should look for any criticism.  We only blame her if she goes to work as a frivolous act and does
not behave appropriately in the workplace.”  The NIF strategy may simply represent an extension
of northern Sudanese (Nile Valley) gender relations to the rest of the country (see Boddy 1985). 
See Kevane and Gray (1995) for more discussion. 
7.Already in western Sudan there seemed to be clear evidence of a deepening feminization of
poverty (Riely 1989).
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8.The word is derived from the Arabic root for coffee, gahwa.  The singular for coffeehouse, in
western Sudan, is also gahwa.
9.The letter was copied to the administrative officer (Dabit tanfizi) of El Obeid district, the police
chief of Kazgeil (a large neighboring village), the omda of Kazgeil, the shiekh of Um Belda, and
“Gahwa owners.”  The translation is by the author.
10.The text is from interview material recorded in Kevane (1993).
11.The whole idea of ‘ranking’ ethnic groups, and men and women, is fraught with troubling
implications.  First, there is considerable variation within groups, across villages, households and
individuals.  Second, men are equally subject to certain restrictive norms.  Sometimes men are
forced into marriages against their will.  Sometimes they are required to support, or even ‘marry’,
the widows of their deceased brothers.  Sometimes a woman leaves her husband and children for
months, with nary an excuse or apology.  Third, discussions of women’s status were often used in
the colonial period as justifications for colonial rule (Labouret 1940).  Just as in Sudan,
discussions of gender risk being used as rhetorical devices favoring other less apparent interest
groups.
12.The discussion that follows draws freely on Capron and Kohler (1978), Retel-Laurentin
(1973), and Weidelener (1973).
13.Policies need not be coercive, or implemented by government.  Indeed, they are often more
likely to be successful when organized on a private, voluntary basis.
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Figure 1: How commercialization afects actions and welfare of men and women
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Figure 2:  Decision tree for marriage offers by men and acceptances by women
M = man makes first move
W = woman makes second decision 
Source: Modified from Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996)
 Figure 3:  Average time women spent on fields of husband, according to husband's oxen
Source: Author survey, 1995
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